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Abstract. Anonymous networks have enabled secure and anonymous
communication between the users and service providers while maintain-
ing their anonymity and privacy. The hidden services in the networks are
dynamic and continuously change their domains and service features to
maintain anonymity and prevent fingerprinting. This makes modelling of
such networks a challenging task. Further, modelling with crisp graphs
is not suitable as they cannot capture the dynamic nature of the anony-
mous networks. In this work, we model the anonymous networks using
fuzzy graphs and provide a methodology to simulate and analyse an
anonymous network. We consider the case studies of two popular anony-
mous communication networks: Tor and Freenet, and show how the two
networks can be analyzed using our proposed fuzzy representation.
Keywords: Fuzzy Graphs, Anonymous Networks, Network Analysis,
Privacy, Anonymity
1 Introduction
Communication and social networks have undergone a significant change with
the onset of the Internet and rapid technological improvements. These networks
are the backbone of every country’s economic and technological growth with
large fractions of the businesses moving to Internet based clouds. Increasing
government surveillance and data collection by large corporations, creates the
need for privacy and anonymity of the users in the networks. Recent revelations
by Snowden on massive government surveillance has reiterated the importance
of private and secure communications [31][16]. Anonymous communication net-
works are one of the approaches by which users can communicate securely with-
out revealing their identity and send traffic via one or more proxies to obfuscate
the true source and destination of messages. These networks use encryption tech-
niques for maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of data. Some popular
anonymous networks are Freenet[12], Tor[7], GNUnet[3] and I2P[4].
Most of the anonymous networks rely on a large number of volunteer run
nodes for routing the traffic from the users to the server. These nodes are often
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unavailable(offline) or malicious, making the network’s dependability, reliabil-
ity, availability and trust as important parameters to consider in deriving the
security metrics. Recent research in this area shows that in order to mitigate fin-
gerprinting attacks to de-anonymize the hidden services, it is important to have
small dynamic websites instead of large, static websites which are more vulner-
able to fingerprinting resulting in deanonymizing the services[23][8]. BuFLO[15]
proposed a defence against traffic correlation attacks[20] by injecting dummy
traffic into the network to obfuscate the genuine traffic which results in vary-
ing network communication between the nodes. To defend against the various
attacks and maintain anonymity, a large number of hidden services constantly
change their domain names and website content which results in uncertainty in
the total available nodes and data communicated for each website in the network.
As a result of the uncertainty in the nodes and traffic in the network, the
network cannot be modelled efficiently as a crisp graph as it fails to capture the
uncertainity in varying traffic density and unavailability of nodes. In such cases,
where some aspects of a graph-theoretic problem are uncertain and vague, it is
natural to deal with the uncertainty and vagueness using fuzzy set theory. We
can model the anonymous networks as random, fuzzy graphs, where randomness
is associated with either the nodes(fuzzy vertices) or with fuzzy weights(crisp
vertices), where the weights denote the strength of association, and other metrics
of association between the nodes of the graph. Modelling of these anonymous
overlay networks using fuzzy graphs enables us the following
(i) Better understanding of the underlying dynamics of such networks in-
cluding routing of data packets which influences the network traffic, delay and
congestion. Such techniques can help mitigate traffic correlation attacks and
routing attacks[17][28] to deanonymize the users.
(ii) Describing the spatial structure of the networks and predicting changes
in the flow pattern due to changes in the spatial density of nodes and identifying
the optimal route to transfer a data.
(iii) Analyse the reliability and error tolerance of anonymous communication
networks to DoS attacks and random failures to help build robust networks.
In this work, we make the following main contributions:
- We propose fuzzy graphs to model anonymous communication networks
where the nodes and edges of the graphs are modelled as fuzzy variables.
- We provide a methodology to simulate the fuzzy graph model of these
networks using percolation algorithm and use network analysis to understand
the structure and metrics from the simulation.
- We compare and analyse two popular anonymous communication networks:
Tor(an example of Mixnets) and Freenet(an example of Peer to Peer(P2P)) as
case studies. We highlight the distinct characteristics of these two networks, to
derive their network parameters and structure.
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we describe the related work
in this area; fuzzy graph based techniques for representing anonymous networks
is introduced in Section 3, and simulating fuzziness in graphs using node per-
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colation algorithm is described in Section 4. This is followed by case studies of
TOR and Freenet using the proposed fuzzy representation.
2 Related Work
Conventional social networks have been explored extensively and mathemati-
cally modelled[19][22][33] to understand the network properties of modern com-
munication networks. However, analysing anonymous communication networks
is difficult as they use special domains and require additional packages and tools
to access them.
A comparison of social networks like Facebook and Twitter with Whisper
anonymous network was shown in [32] based on network metrics. Whisper anony-
mous communication networks has shown to have multiple levels of anonymity
for the user’s posts and the anonymity of the user’s posts vary with demograph-
ics like gender, age and education[13]. A privacy and network analysis of Tor[27]
show that the network may leak information by communicating with surface
web resulting in de-anonymizing the user. For understanding the resilience of
anonymous networks, network attacks have been shown not only lead to denial
of service but also lowering of anonymity as messages need to get retransmitted
to be delivered, presenting more opportunities for attack[10].
However, none of the previous works have mathematically modelled the
anonymous communication networks using fuzzy graphs. Most works model the
networks as unweighted digraphs(crisp graphs), and do not capture the uncer-
tainty associated with the nodes, vertices, weights, and randomness in the node
structures and connectivity, which are the dominant characteristics of anony-
mous networks. To address this, we model anonymous networks as fuzzy graphs
and propose a method to simulate fuzzy graphs using node percolation.
3 Fuzzy Graph Representation of Anonymous Networks
Zadeh introduced a mathematical framework to explain the concept of uncer-
tainty and vagueness in real life in his seminal papers [35][36][37]. A fuzzy set is
defined mathematically by assigning to each possible individual in the universe
of discourse a value, representing its grade of membership, which corresponds to
the degree, to which that individual is similar or compatible with the concept
represented by the fuzzy set. The fuzzy graph introduced by Rosenfeld [25] us-
ing fuzzy relations, represents the relationship between the objects by precisely
indicating the level of the relationship between the objects of the given set. A
number of related concepts based on fuzzy analogous graph theoretic concepts
such as bridge, cut vertex and tree were also proposed. Fuzzy graphs have many
important applications in modelling real time systems where the level of infor-
mation inherent in the system varies with different levels of precision[21][9][34].
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3.1 Fuzzy Graphs: Basic Definitions
For traditional networks, we model the graphs as an ordered pair G = (V,E)
comprising a set V of vertices with a set E of edges or arcs or lines, which are
two-element subsets of V comprising of the source and destination. To model a
fuzzy graph, we use the following definitions[29]:
Definition 1. A fuzzy subset of a non-empty set S is a mapping σ : S → [0,1]
which assigns to each element x in S a degree of membership, 0 ≤ σ(x) ≤ 1.
Definition 2. A fuzzy relation on S is a fuzzy subset of S × S. A fuzzy relation
µ on S is a fuzzy relation on the fuzzy subset σ if µ(x, y) ≤ σ(x) ∧ σ(y) for all
x, y in S where ∧ stands for minimum. A fuzzy relation on the fuzzy subset σ
is reflexive if µ(x, x) = σ(x) for all xS. A fuzzy relation µ on S is said to be
symmetric if µ(x, y) = µ(y, x) for all x, yS.
Definition 3. A fuzzy graph is a pair G : (σ, µ) where σ is a fuzzy subset of S,
µ is a symmetric fuzzy relation on σ. The elements of S are called the nodes or
vertices of G and the pair of vertices as edges in G. The underlying crisp graph
of the fuzzy graph G : (σ, µ) is denoted as G∗ : (S,E) where E ⊆ S × S. The
crisp graph (S,E) is a special case of the fuzzy graph G with each vertex and
edge of (S,E) having degree of membership 1.
Definition 4. (σ′, µ′) is a fuzzy sub graph or a partial fuzzy sub graph of (σ, µ)
if σ’ ⊆ σ and µ’ ⊆ µ; that is if σ’(u) ≤ σ(u) for every u  S and µ’(e) ≤ µ(e)
for every e  E.
Definition 5. (σ′, µ′) is a fuzzy spanning sub graph of (σ, µ) if σ’ = σ and µ’ ⊆
µ; that is if σ’(u) = σ(u) for every u  S and µ’(e) ≤ µ(e) for every e  E. For
any fuzzy subset ν of S such that ν ⊆ σ, the fuzzy sub graph of (σ, µ) induced
by n is the maximal fuzzy sub graph of (σ, µ), that has fuzzy vertex set ν and
it is the fuzzy sub graph (ν, τ) where τ(u, v) = ν(u) ∧ ν(v) ∧ µ(u, v) for all u,
v in S.
3.2 Fuzzy Graph Taxonomy
A taxonomy of fuzzy graphs that treats fuzziness in vertex existence, edge ex-
istence, edge connectivity, and edge weight was proposed by Bush et.al.[9]. The
Types of Fuzzy graphs are classified as follows:
– Type I: Fuzzy set of Crisp Graphs
– Type II: Crisp vertex set and Fuzzy edge set: Here, the graph has known
vertices but unknown edges. i.e, the vertex set is crisp and the edge set is
fuzzy.
– Type III: Crisp vertices and edges with fuzzy connectivity: In contrast with
Type II graph fuzziness, we have a graph with known vertices and edges but
unknown edge connectivity, i.e, both the vertex and edge sets are crisp but
the edges have fuzzy variables.
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– Type IV: Fuzzy vertex set and Crisp edge set: We have a graph with un-
known vertices but known edges, hence, the vertex set is fuzzy and the edge
set is crisp.
– Type V: Crisp graph with fuzzy weights: In this case, the graph has known
vertices and edges but unknown weights on the edges, i.e only the weights
are fuzzy.
In this paper, we use the above taxonomy and definitions to model the anony-
mous communication networks as fuzzy graphs. The fuzziness in graphs may be
modelled by considering (i) the number of vertices(Type IV) to be uncertain or
(ii) edge connectivity as random(Type V). In this work, we consider the more
common and applicable case of randomness in nodes and simulate the fuzzi-
ness in the nodes by proposing random node percolation algorithm for Type IV
graphs which is explained in the following section. This approach can be ex-
tended to simulate Type V graphs as future work by varying the weights of the
edges that represent varying network traffic in the nodes. This study could help
explain the dynamics of data flow in the anonymous networks.
4 Simulating Fuzziness in Graphs using Node Percolation
In order to capture the uncertainty in the nodes of the anonymous networks,
we provide a systematic approach to model and simulate the networks as fuzzy
graphs using node percolation algorithm.
4.1 Anonymous Networks
Anonymous Networks can be grouped into either mixnets[11] or P2P[24] net-
works based on the underlying protocols. Mixnets use multiple stages of en-
cryption and decryption and the data goes through various permutations to
facilitate secure transmission anonymously between client and the server. On
the other hand, P2P networks allow communication among different computers
without using a dedicated server to facilitate communication. All the nodes are
at the same privilege level and use special protocols for communication within
the network. These protocols also include mixnet protocols like onion routing
protocols along with public key cryptography for ensuring data integrity and
security. Each node acts as both a supplier and consumer of resources, unlike
client-server model, and contributes a part of its computational resources to the
network. Routing of traffic is decided using hash tables provided by each node.
In this work, we focus on the analysis of two such anonymous networks: Tor and
Freenet. Fig. 1 shows the network structure visualisations of both Tor(Mixnet)
and Freenet(P2P) where we observe that Freenet has strongly connected net-
work core while Tor has a densely connected core with a sparse structure along
with several node clusters.
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Fig. 1. Network visualisation of a) Tor and b) Freenet using Gephi
Tor Network. Tor, acronym for the onion router, is a commonly used anony-
mous communication network based on Mixnet. It is a second generation low-
latency onion routing protocol which is an example of asynchronous free rout-
ing mixnet[26]. It provides a high throughput with low latency typical for web
browsing, emailing, chats and downloading content securely and anonymously
and provides perfect forward secrecy[14]. At each node, a multistage encrypted
Tor packet is decrypted to reveal the address of the destination node. Each node
only sees the encrypted payload and hence the data remains secure at each node.
The server-side anonymity is achieved by using hidden services[6]. In case of Tor,
onion services are used to host sensitive content such as whistleblower platform,
activist blogs and have a strong anonymity requirement.
Freenet Network. Freenet is based on P2P architecture and is a decentralised
network that achieves anonymity by passing requests through multiple interme-
diary nodes acting as a proxy before reaching the destination node. It operates
in two modes: Darknet and Opennet. While Darknet mode of operation allows
nodes to connect to known nodes or run by known and trusted people, Opennet
allows nodes to connect to any users on the network[12].
4.2 Data Collection
For analysing the network structure of both the anonymous communication net-
works, we crawl through the deep web sites and compile a dataset which includes
approximately 15,000 unique nodes representing websites in Tor and different
user nodes in case of Freenet. An initial seed list of Tor links was scraped from
various online dumps and forums and we used an open source tool[2][5] to index
the Tor network and create an edge table from it. For Freenet, data was collected
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using Web of Trust plugin that created a trust graph of different nodes in the
Freenet network[1]. Each dataset had columns containing the source and a des-
tination node which indicated the presence of an edge between them. We filtered
out each of the networks to get the giant component and remove isolated nodes.
We further set the degree range to ensure relevant nodes are present in the net-
work. We computed network metrics which include: degree distribution, average
path length, network diameter, assortativity, network resilience and clustering
coefficient using NetworkX library and Gephi.
4.3 Simulating Fuzziness
To simulate the uncertainty in the edge connectivity, we randomly remove nodes
and corresponding edges using percolation method given in Algorithm 1. We
measure the effect of this on the average degree and average path length for
different degree of percolation and the results are shown in Fig. 2. In this work,
we simulate the fuzziness in the nodes of the network but this can be extended
to simulate fuzziness in edge weights by changing the weights and analyse the
effect on the networks.
Algorithm 1 Random Node Percolation Algorithm to simulate the node fuzzi-
ness in anonymous networks
1: Given: V={v1, v2.., vn} a set of n vertices in the graph G=(V,E) where E is the
set of edges
2: Input t: Number of Nodes to remove out of the total nodes
3: r ← 0
4: while r 6= t do
5: i ← rand() {Generate Index between 1 and n}
6: V.del(i) {Delete node from vertex set and corresponding edges}
7: r ← r + 1
8: end while
9: return Graph G’=(V’,E’) where E’ is the set of edges after removing Vt vertices
and V ′ = V − Vt is the remaining set of vertices.
Generally, removal of a path between two nodes in scale-free networks leads to
an increase in the average path length of the network due to increase in distance
between any two nodes[22]. On removing nodes from the network, we observe
that the average path length increases for Freenet as expected. Surprisingly, the
average path length decreases for Tor network which is unlike typical complex
network behaviour. This may be attributed to the fact that the Tor network is
sparse and has many isolated node clusters(shown in Section 4.4). As a result of
random network attack, these nodes are disconnected from rest of the network
resulting in a dense, well-connected core having a lower average path length. In
case of average degree, the decrease is gradual in Freenet as compared to Tor.
This suggests that the Freenet network is well connected even after the removal
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of a significant fraction of nodes in the network and indicates that Freenet is
more robust to large node failure as compared to Tor. Based on these results,
we can clearly distinguish between Mixnets and P2P anonymous networks. P2P
networks seem to have an edge over Mixnets in terms of security and robustness
of the networks. Freenet being robust to network attacks will be more resistant
to Denial of Service attacks as compared to Tor. Mixnets like Tor have a central
point of failure while P2P networks have no node hierarchy and hence there is
no central point of failure.
Fig. 2. Effect of Random Network Attack on Path Length and Degree
These results can be better understood by looking at the network structure of
the anonymous communication networks for which we use social network analysis
techniques to map the networks and compute the various network metrics.
4.4 Network Analysis
Degree Distribution. The degree is defined as the total number of connections of
a particular node. We define pk to be the fraction of vertices in the network that
have degree k then a plot of pk for any given network can be formed by making
a histogram of the degrees of vertices which is the degree distribution for the
network. A key factor in identifying small world networks is by confirming the
scale-free power law distribution. Scale free property of networks is determined
by the degree distribution of the nodes. The power law distribution of Tor and
Freenet networks are plotted in Fig. 3 which confirms the scale free property since
both the networks follow power laws: pk ∝ k−α for some constant exponent α.
Table 1. Comparing Network Metrics: Tor vs Freenet
Network Average Degree Average Path Length Radius Diameter Assortativity Clustering Coefficient
Tor 2.982 4.630 0 16 -0.20 0.279
Freenet 18.362 2.965 0 6 -0.16 0.264
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Table 1 shows the average degree of Freenet to be 18.362 which is quite high
as compared to 2.982 for the Tor network. This may be attributed to the P2P
architecture of Freenet where no node is privileged over other nodes and most of
the nodes actively participate in information storage and retrieval. This results
in a very well connected network. Tor, on the other hand, has a large number
of nodes connected to a central node which might be acting as a hosting server.
The client-server model of Tor results in a lower average degree than Freenet.
Fig. 3. Power Law Distribution between number of nodes and degree on log-log scale
Average Path Length. Average Path Length(L) is defined as the mean distance
dij between two nodes (i and j) averaged across all the nodes. Eccentricity is a
set of maximum distances between a node and any other node in the network.
The diameter of a network is defined as the maximum value in the eccentricity
set while the radius of a network is the minimum value of in the eccentricity set.
In the Table, we see that the path length of Tor network is higher as compared
to Freenet. The lower value of average path length in Freenet can be due to
the high degree of reciprocity among the nodes which are actively engaged in
storing and retrieving data. The degree of reciprocity in Tor networks is less
due to centralised nature of network resulting in higher average path length.
The large value of diameter of Tor as compared to Freenet indicates a sparse
Tor network and a dense and compact Freenet network. The radius of both the
networks is zero indicating the presence of isolated nodes in the network.
Clustering Coefficient. Clustering Coefficient(C) is a ratio P/Q, where P is the
number of edges between the neighbours of a node and Q is the maximum
number of edges that could possibly exist between the neighbours of the node.
The value of Clustering Coefficient always lies between 0 and 1 and Table 1
shows Freenet having a lower number of clusters than Tor network. Fig. 4 shows
the variation of clustering coefficient with respect to out-degree of nodes in both
Tor and Freenet and we observe that the nodes with lower out-degree have a
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higher clustering coefficient in both the networks suggesting that isolated nodes
exist in clusters. The nodes in Tor are more concentrated than Freenet for lower
outdegree which indicates higher clustering in less connected nodes. The above
results are common characteristic of small world networks.
Fig. 4. Distribution of Clustering Coefficient with Outdegree
Assortativity. Assortativity is a measure of the probability that nodes of similar
degree are attached together and is the Pearson’s correlation coefficient. The
range of this coefficient lies between -1 to 1 and a positive or high coefficient
suggests that nodes of similar degree are attached to each other while a nega-
tive coefficient suggests that the nodes of different degree are connected to each
other(preferential attachment). From Table 1, we see that Tor and Freenet have a
high negative assortativity coefficient which suggests that nodes of dissimilar de-
grees are attached to each other. Tor has a higher negative value as compared to
Freenet which indicates that there are a few nodes with a very high degree(hubs
or super-hubs) acting as a server or hosting site which are connected to a large
number of very low degree nodes which are isolated websites or resources. In
Freenet, the nodes are well connected with a high average degree which explains
the higher assortativity coefficient as compared to Tor.
The above analysis using network metrics provides a comprehensive com-
parison between Tor and Freenet and verifies and explains the results obtained
using node percolation algorithm. The proposed systematic methodology to sim-
ulate fuzzy graphs can be used to model and analyse various other real world
networks like citation network[30], temporal networks, location networks and
communication networks[18].
5 Conclusion
There is a growing concern of privacy of internet and it is important to analyse
the anonymous communication networks which provide the users a means to
hide their identity on the internet. We provide a mathematical framework using
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Fuzzy Graphs to represent the anonymous communication network as a fuzzy
graph with fuzzy vertices. To simulate the fuzziness in the networks, we propose
the percolation algorithm to randomly remove nodes and use this approach to
analyze two popular anonymous networks: Tor and Freenet. A comparison be-
tween Tor and Freenet using the proposed framework is presented and network
analysis and network metrics are derived for the two networks, to understand
the structure and effect of random node percolation.
As part of future work, fuzziness in the edges is being studied by using edge
percolation algorithm and by changing the weights of the edges. The fuzzy model
could be used for modelling dynamic processes within the anonymous networks
including traffic flow which can be used for optimising routing algorithms for
lower latency. The proposed methodology helps to analyse, understand the bot-
tlenecks and vulnerabilities in the networks and find mitigations against network
attacks in cyber security and cyber warfare scenarios.
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